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Abstract 
Beyond dealing with wrongdoing and litigation, law has many other functions. It can 
be designed to make life more predictable, it can facilitate and promote certain 
actions, it can seek to prevent disputes by laying down rules, and provide routes to 
solutions other than litigation should disputes arise. All of these can have connections 
to matters of emotion. Using both lawbooks and records of cases from the Angevin 
period, the present article begins by looking at issues of land law rather than crime, 
and at law outside rather than inside court. It then returns to crime and litigation 
before exploring the significance of the nature of legal records for the relationship 
between emotion and law. In doing so, it pays attention to emotion in action, to uses 
of emotionally-charged language, to appearances of the vocabulary of emotions, and 
to the routinized use of words that might at other times or in other contexts have an 
emotional element. Underlying the analysis is an exploration of the ways in which 
some aspects of law became more discrete from ordinary social practice and 
discourse, in this instance through elements of distancing from emotion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The majority of work on the history of emotions and law has focused on wrongdoing 
and on activity in courtrooms. This is true for the medieval period as for others. 
Particularly significant have been studies such as Paul R. Hyams’ Rancor and 
Reconciliation, with its focus on wrongdoing and the conduct of disputes, outside and 
inside court, and the essays of Stephen D. White, on trials in literary texts.1 And 
                                                        
1 Paul R. Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England, Ithaca, 2003; e.g. 
Stephen D. White, ‘The Evils of the Court: Judicial Melodramas in Medieval French 
Literature’, in John Hudson and Sally Crumplin, eds., “The Making of Europe”: 
Essays in Honour of Robert Bartlett, Leiden, 2016, 184–204, and more generally ‘The 
Politics of Anger’, in Barbara H. Rosenwein, ed., Anger’s Past, Ithaca, 1998, 127–
152, and ‘The Feelings in the Feud: The Emotional Turn in the Study of Medieval 
Vengeance’, in Kim Esmark, Lars Hermanson, Hans Jacob Orning and Helle Vogt, 
eds., Disputing Strategies in Medieval Scandinavia, Leiden, 2013, 281–311. Highly 
influential has been the work of William Ian Miller, from the consideration of 
vengeance in Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland, 
Chicago, 1990, to the wide-ranging explorations of emotions in “Why is Your Axe 
Bloody?”: A Reading of Njáls Saga, Oxford, 2014, and Hrafnkel or the Ambiguities, 
Oxford, 2017. For an important later medieval study, see Daniel Lord Smail, The 
Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 1264-
1423, Ithaca, 2003. From still later periods, see e.g. the excellent analyses in Susanne 
Pohl-Zucker, Making Manslaughter, Leiden, 2017, and Mark Seymour, ‘Emotional 
Arenas: from Provincial Circus to National Courtroom in Late Nineteenth-Century 
Italy’, 16 Rethinking History (2012), 177–197. A version of this paper was delivered 
as the first lecture in the Harvard Law School European Legal History Series in April 
2017, and I would like to thank members of the audience for their stimulating 
questions. I would also like to thank Professor Paul Brand, Merridee Bailey, and 
Kimberley-Joy Knight for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of the article. 
Conversations with Dr Knight provided the inspiration for writing the paper and for 
many of its ideas, and whatever is good in it also owes much to the long-standing 
influences of Paul Hyams, Bill Miller, and Steve White.  
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whilst writings on contemporary law and emotions point out that the field is wider 
than crime and litigation, those topics remain a primary focus.2 
 Yet beyond dealing with wrongdoing and litigation, law has many other 
functions. It can be designed to make life more predictable, it can facilitate and 
promote certain actions, it can seek to prevent disputes by laying down rules, and 
provide routes to solutions other than litigation should disputes arise. All of these can 
have connections to matters of emotion. Using both lawbooks and records of cases 
from the Angevin period, the present article begins by looking at issues of land law 
rather than crime, and at law outside rather than inside court. It then returns to crime 
and litigation before exploring the significance of the nature of legal records for the 
relationship between emotion and law. In doing so, it pays attention to emotion in 
action, to uses of emotionally-charged language, to appearances of the vocabulary of 
emotions, and to the routinized use of words that might at other times or in other 
contexts have an emotional element. Underlying the analysis is an exploration of the 
ways in which some aspects of law became more discrete from ordinary social 
practice and discourse, in this instance through elements of distancing from emotion. 
 
II. CONTROL OF ALIENATION OF LAND 
 
Land was the crucial resource of the powerful, and indeed the less powerful, in the 
medieval period. Control of land and access to it, its passing between generations, and 
its grant to others, were essential to the maintenance and extension of power. 
Landholding could be closely connected to personal relationships involving elements 
of emotion, formalized or less formalized, notably in our period with the conjuncture 
of the tenurial and the homage bonds.3 In the distribution of land, be it within the 
                                                        
2 Excellent starting points are Susan A. Bandes, ed., The Passions of Law, New York, 
1999; Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren, ‘Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?’, 94 
Minnesota Law Review (2010), 1997–2074.  
3  See esp. Stroud F. C. Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism, 
Cambridge, 1976; John Hudson, Land, Law, and Lordship in Anglo-Norman England, 
Oxford, 1994. 
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family or without, issues of emotion were likely to meet with issues of law. 4 
Affection could be an appropriate motive for a grant, and emotion could also enter 
into grants in a variety of other ways.5 A famous charter from mid-twelfth-century 
England presents the son’s obligation to maintain his father’s gift to a church in 
emotive terms, even if without specific emotion words – indeed emotional force is 
conveyed through legal imagery:  
if this man’s heir should try to take away the alms which is interposed as a 
bridge between his father and Paradise, by which his father may be able to 
pass over, the heir, so far as he may, is disinheriting his father from the 
kingdom of heaven, and therefore by right shall not obtain the remaining 
inheritance, since he who has killed his father has proved himself no son.6 
Furthermore, certainly at the time of this charter, crucial aspects of the alienability of 
land were not a matter of fixed, hard rules. Rather there was room for negotiation, and 
also for problems to arise, notably through conflicting views of reasonable practice. In 
the same charter, the donor is made to say:  
I have done this by the advice and with the approval of many wise men, 
moved especially by the exhortation, requests and counsel of the lord 
Theobald, archbishop of Canterbury and primate of all England, who showed 
me by the most reasonable and unanswerable arguments (racionabilibus et 
uerissimis assercionarum) that it is most just that a noble and generous man 
who has a fief of six knights should bestow not only the third part of a 
knight’s land on God and the holy church for the health of his own soul and 
his kin’s, but the whole of a knight’s land or more than that.                                                         
4 Note esp. Stephen D. White, ‘The Discourse of Inheritance in Twelfth-Century 
France: Alternative Models of the Fief in “Raoul de Cambrai”’, in George Garnett 
and John Hudson, eds., Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy: 
Essays in Honour of Sir James Holt, Cambridge, 1994, 173–197. 
5 See Curia Regis Rolls, London, 1922-present, vol.1, 389, for a woman in a 1201 
case saying that she had been persuaded into a grant by a mixture of threats, tricks, 
and sweet-talking, such that she was persuaded that she loved the grantee, and he 
loved her. 
6 Sir Frank Stenton, The First Century of English Feudalism, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1961, 
38–40, 260–261. 
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Clearly in this case there was no simple formula for how much might be given to the 
church. It was a matter for persuasion by the greatest prelate in the land, suggesting 
that either donor, or other parties, or both, may have had potentially conflicting 
interests in, and attachments to, the land. Use of the adjective ‘reasonable 
[racionabilis]’ could indicate that one method of persuasion that the archbishop used 
was to differentiate in carefully logical fashion what was proper from what was 
emotionally desired by the parties who needed persuading; at the same time, the 
archbishop was selling his ideas in an emotional fashion, in his appeal to close family 
bonds. 
The discussion of alienation in Book VII of the lawbook known as Glanvill (c. 
1188) contains much that sounds purely technical law but emotion too is mentioned.7 
The anonymous author operates within a framework of reasonableness as to the 
amount that is alienable. He is particularly concerned with situations where disputes 
might arise, where there might be a perception of unreasonableness. In such 
circumstances emotional expectation and legal norm might come into conflict.  
 Glanvill distinguishes between the man who has only land that he has 
inherited, the man who has only land that he has acquired, and the man who has both. 
In the case of the man who has only inherited land, the author confronts an apparent 
anomaly, where law and expected emotion conflict. The landholder 
can, as has been said, give a certain part of that inheritance to any stranger he 
wishes. However, if he has several legitimate sons, he can hardly give any part 
of the inheritance to a younger son without the heir’s consent; for if this were 
allowed, the disinheritance of eldest sons would often occur, because of the 
greater affection [maiorem … affectionem] that fathers tend to have for 
younger sons.8                                                         
7 Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Anglie qui Glanvilla Vocatur, ed. 
and trans. G. Derek G. Hall, Edinburgh, 1965. For a brief summary of views on 
authorship, see John Hudson, The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume II 
871-1216, Oxford, 2012, 872–873. 
8 Glanvill, Bk vii ch. 1, ed. Hall, 70. For important comments on ideas of affectio in 
the learned rhetorical tradition, ideas that possibly illuminate Glanvill’s use of the 
word, see Rita Copeland, ‘Affectio in the Tradition of the De Inventione: Philosophy 
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Here we have law recognizing and working to prevent what is presented as the unfair 
effect of emotion upon behaviour. However, the author displays an awareness of the 
incongruity of the situation. He here mentions the fact that a grant to a stranger 
required no consent. He goes on to mention a still more striking contrast to the 
situation with a younger son: ‘Can a man who has a son and heir give from his 
inheritance to his bastard son? If he can, then the bastard son will be better off in this 
matter than the legitimate son; notwithstanding this, he can do so’.9 Here a rule of law 
is having an effect that is unexpected, both socially and emotionally. One sees a 
classic instance of legal development: law solves a problem, that of potential 
excessive generosity to younger sons, yet in this instance the solution creates an 
anomaly. 
 It could be that the mention of fathers’ favour for younger sons is in some way 
related to Henry II’s favour for his youngest son, the future King John. This 
relationship is relevant for a discussion slightly later in Book VII, of the so-called 
casus regis, ‘the king’s case’: ‘when anyone dies leaving a younger son, and a 
grandson born of the eldest son already dead, a great legal problem arises as to which 
of them is to be preferred in that succession, namely, whether the son or the 
grandson’.10 This would be the situation facing the royal house in 1199, and which 
may have been under consideration at the time Glanvill was writing in the late 1180s. 
However, this time Glanvill’s discussion does not mention issues of emotion. It could                                                                                                                                                               
and Pragmatism’, in Georgiana Donavin and Denise Stodola, eds., Public 
Declamations: Essays on Medieval Rhetoric, Education, and Letters in Honour of 
Martin Camargo, Turnhout, 2015, 3–20, esp. 4–11. 
9 Glanvill, Bk vii ch. 1, ed. Hall, 70–71. If one reads Book VII as being influenced by 
the internal politics of the royal family, the grant of Appleby in Lincolnshire to Henry 
II’s illegitimate son William Longéspee in 1188 may be of relevance here; 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16983> accessed 20 April 2017. There is a 
possibility that Book VII in the form we have it was not entirely produced before 
1189. If the work comes from the circle of Ranulf de Glanville, his close connection 
to the future King John may be of importance; note 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10795> accessed 1 Feb. 2017. 
10 Glanvill, Bk vii ch. 3, ed. Hall, 77.  
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be that this silence was because the problem was a specifically legal one, and the 
author did not feel obliged to raise issues of affectio. Or it could be that he chose to 
remain silent despite – or perhaps because of – Henry’s known favour for John, 
instead either avoiding controversy or making a coded contribution to debate on the 
subject. 
A further associated topic that Glanvill analyses is the norm that ‘according to 
the law of the realm no one can be at the same time heir and lord of the same 
tenement’.11 Such is a clear statement of a legal norm. It appears in a discussion of 
gifts within the family, a discussion that begins ‘because of the generosity that fathers 
are accustomed to display to their sons or to others in making gifts of this kind [i.e. of 
inherited land], certain legal problems frequently arise’. Gift-giving, and its possible 
legal consequences, are thus again seen as arising from an impulse that could at least 
in part be emotional, generosity [liberalitas]. Here problems are foreseen, for example 
with a gift made to a second son, who predeceases his father. Who should succeed? 
Glanvill’s discussion proceeds according to the logic of rules of law, allowing no 
room for emotion or indeed for what might be the legally-uninformed social 
expectation.12 Only with seeming reluctance does he allow that the king’s court might 
in particular circumstances reach a decision contrary to the logic of the rules, ‘out of 
equity’, thereby allowing greater room for an outcome that was acceptable in terms of 
social and emotional expectation.13  
 Another instance where emotion might enter into giving in ways that could 
lead to dispute was the deathbed gift, where loss of reason might lead to bad decision-
making, at least in the eyes of those who lost out:14  
                                                        
11 Glanvill, Bk vii ch. 1, ed. Hall, 72; note the repeated use of the word ‘ratione’. 
12 See further John Hudson, ‘From the Leges to Glanvill: Legal Expertise and Legal 
Reasoning in Twelfth-Century England’, in Stefan Jurasinski, Lisi Oliver, and 
Andrew Rabin, eds., English Law before Magna Carta: Felix Liebermann and Die 
Gesetze der Angelsachsen, Leiden, 2010, 221–249. 
13 Glanvill, Bk vii ch. 1, ed. Hall, 74. 
14 Note e.g. Curia Regis Rolls, vol.1, 352–353, where a man is said to have made a 
charter on his deathbed, ‘which he ought not and could not according to the custom of 
the realm’. See also e.g. ibid., vol.1, 257, for a gift being challenged on the grounds 
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although the general rule is that any person is allowed to give freely in his 
lifetime a reasonable part of his land to whom he wishes, this has not hitherto 
been permitted for those about to die, because there might be an extravagant 
distribution of the inheritance if it were permitted to one who loses both 
memory and reason in the turmoil of his present suffering [feruore passionis 
instantis et memoriam amittit et rationem], a common enough happening.15 
Reason would have ensured a proper distribution of the inheritance, the donor 
remembering all those who should receive grants; excessive emotion conflicted with 
reasonableness, and law was to be on the side of reason. A particular fear, although 
one not specified by Glanvill, was pressure from ecclesiastics seeking that a dying 
person give to the church in the hope of improving chances of salvation. According to 
an early thirteenth-century chronicle, in the 1190s some men claimed that, by a recent 
law,  
no one, however great, who had taken to his bed because of illness, is to be 
permitted in his final will to bequeath to anyone anything from his lands or 
tenements that he had possessed up until then, nor even be able to confer them 
on monks, who are beloved beyond others [pre aliis dilectis].16 
Although there is no further precise evidence about this claimed law, this passage 
remains significant: as in Glanvill, so also elsewhere, law could be deliberately 
presented as a means of restricting or preventing any unreasonable effect threatened 
by what might be classified as improper emotion. 
There are further instances where Glanvill explains law in terms of preventing 
disputes linked to emotion.17 One is the need for seignorial consent when a man 
                                                                                                                                                              
that it was made on the donor’s deathbed. In both these cases the beneficiaries of the 
grants were churches. Note further, e.g., ibid., vol.1, 386–387, vol.6, 351–352. 
15 Glanvill, Bk vii ch. 1, ed. Hall, 70. 
16 The Book of the Foundation of Walden Monastery, Bk iv ch. 18, ed. and trans. 
Diana Greenway and Leslie Watkiss, Oxford, 1999, 144. For pressure from clerics, 
note also Hudson, Land, Law, and Lordship, 195 n.97, Hudson, Oxford History, 362 
n.167.  
17 Note also Glanvill, Bk vii ch. 12, ed. Hall, 86, on incontinence of an heiress or 
widow. 
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without sons wished to marry off a daughter, in such circumstances an heir. In this 
case the issue is explained in terms of enmity: 
the reason for this is that, since the husband of the heiress is bound to do 
homage to the lord for that tenement, the agreement and consent of that lord is 
necessary for doing it, lest he be forced to receive homage concerning his fee 
from his enemy or some other unsuitable person.18 
Elsewhere Glanvill discusses further situations in which emotional conflict was likely 
to cause, and be intertwined with, legal conflict.19 In such instances we may see law 
as being intended to prevent future arguments at likely emotional flashpoints. One 
such issue is a woman’s dower claims on lands that her husband had acquired after 
their marriage. Again Glanvill presents his material and his opinions as simple matters 
of law, without the language of emotions that appear occasionally in his discussion of 
alienability: ‘for it is a general rule that, however much dower and of whatever kind is 
assigned to a woman, if she consents to this assignment of dower at the church door 
she cannot in future lawfully claim [petere] any more as dower’.20 At the same time, 
his text can be read as revealing something of the emotions that might be involved in 
husband-wife property arrangements: 
Any married man may give or sell or alienate in whatever way he pleases his 
wife’s dower during his life, and his wife is bound to consent to him in this as 
in all other matters that do not offend against God. Indeed, to such an extent is 
a woman bound to obey her husband that if he wishes to sell her dower and 
she opposes him, and afterwards the dower is in fact sold and purchased, she 
cannot, when her husband is dead, claim [petere] the dower from the                                                         
18 Glanvill, Bk vii ch. 12, ed. Hall, 85. 
19 See e.g. Glanvill, Bk vii ch. 5, ed. Hall, 79, on heirs observing testaments; note also 
Bk x ch. 14, ed. Hall, 129–130, on the law of sale.  
20 Glanvill, Bk vi ch. 2, ed. Hall, 59–60. Glanvill’s line here seems to be exceptional 
or misleading; on practice, see Hudson, Oxford History, 795–796; Janet S. Loengard, 
‘“Of the Gift of her Husband”: English Dower and its Consequences in the Year 
1200’, in Julius Kirshner and Suzanne F. Wemple, eds., Women in the Medieval 
World: Essays in Honor of John H. Mundy, Oxford, 1985, 215–255; Joseph 
Biancalana, ‘Widows at Common Law: the Development of Common Law Dower’, 
New Series 23 Irish Jurist (1988), 255–329. 
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purchaser if she confesses in court, or it is proved against her, that it was sold 
by her husband against her will.21 
In laying down this rule, Glanvill thus admits the possibility of a wife opposing her 
husband, a possibility rich in space for marital emotion. Furthermore, studies of 
practice indicate that Glanvill underplayed the wife’s position, adding a further level 
of complexity to the inter-relationship of law, marital emotion, and alienability of 
dower.22 
Law, therefore, could facilitate and render secure actions inspired by emotion, 
including grants of land; for example, the favoured bastard son in receipt of a land 
grant was the beneficiary of both law and emotion. Law could also seek to prohibit, or 
render reversible by legal action, conveyances of land inspired by what at least some 
saw as excessive, unreasonable, or transient emotions. These efforts to counter 
improper emotions could, in addition, encourage a further development, thereby being 
of significant indirect influence; particularly when dealing with such matters, the 
author of Glanvill sometimes contrasted reason and emotion, presenting reason as 
characteristic of law. Thus in certain aspects and certain situations those most 
influential on legal development could see law not just as a corrective for excessive 
emotion but more generally as properly discrete from emotion. 
 
III. CRIME 
 
Whereas little attention has been paid to the significance of emotions in the context of 
land law, the field of wrongdoing – what might loosely be called crime – has been 
much more studied. Here emotions are obviously relevant in many aspects, for 
example in motivation, an issue particularly illuminated by Hyams’ study Rancor and 
Reconciliation. 23  Such studies also raise issues in turn for the wider history of                                                         
21 Glanvill, Bk vi ch. 3, ed. Hall, 60. Cf. Glanvill, Bk vi ch. 13, ed. Hall, 65. 
22 Hudson, Oxford History, 796–798. 
23 For the period discussed in the present paper, see esp. Hyams, Rancor, ch. 6. See 
further Elizabeth Papp Kamali, ‘Felonia Felonice Facta: Felony and Intentionality in 
Medieval England’, 9 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2015), 397–421, and ‘The 
Devil’s Daughter of Hell Fire: Anger’s Role in Medieval English Felony Cases’, 35 
Law and History Review (2017), 155–200. Emotions of course could affect land 
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emotions, for example in deciding what should be classified as an emotion: can greed 
or covetousness be fitted within the classificatory scheme used by historians of 
emotion? A primary concern of the present paper is again the limitation or removal of 
emotion from legal matters, in the present section from litigation. Various issues 
could be examined. For example, there is the absence in England, as opposed to some 
other areas, of mortal enmity as a justification of homicide.24 There is the exclusion of 
anger from being ‘recognized officially as a legitimate partial excuse in felony 
cases’.25 And there is the requirement of royal pardon for homicide in self-defence.26 
Self-defence should be justified in terms of emotion, of fear for one’s life;27 there 
should be no pre-meditation, pre-meditation here perhaps being treated as the 
                                                                                                                                                              
disputes; see e.g. Rotuli Curiæ Regis, ed. Sir Francis Palgrave, 2 vols, London, 1835, 
vol.2, 87, for disseisin ‘on account of the lawsuit and hatred’ between the parties. 
Furthermore, land disputes and crime might be inter-related; see below, 000.  
24 See esp. Robert Bartlett, ‘“Mortal Enmities”: the Legal Aspect of Hostility in the 
Middle Ages’, in Belle S. Tuten and Tracey L. Billado, eds., Feud, Violence and 
Practice: Essays in Medieval Studies in Honor of Stephen D. White, Farnham, 2010, 
197–212; also Hyams, Rancor, 57–58. There is a largely unnoticed reference to the 
king of Scots as the ‘mortal enemy’ of the king of England in a case recorded in 
Rotuli Curiæ Regis, vol.2, 30–31, for some of the background to which see Hugh F. 
Doherty, ‘King Henry II’s Charter for Adam, Nepos of the Sheriff of Carlisle’, in 
Keith J. Stringer, ed., North-West England from the Romans to the Tudors: Essays in 
Memory of John MacNair Todd (Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and 
Archaeological Society Extra Series 41), 2014, 87-122, esp. 112-113; note also 
Jordan Fantosme’s Chronicle, ed. and trans. Ronald C. Johnston, Oxford, 1981, lines 
432, 1175, 1584. 
25 Kamali, ‘The Devil’s Daughter’, 199. 
26 See esp. Naomi D. Hurnard, The King’s Pardon for Homicide before A.D. 1307, 
Oxford, 1969. Once juries were giving verdicts on homicide cases it was possible for 
them to transform self-defence cases into ones of accidental killing, allowing acquittal 
in court; Thomas A. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, Chicago, 1985, 89–90. 
27 Note e.g. Hurnard, Pardon, 84–85, 92. 
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opposite of emotion. 28 Killing with an implement used as an ad hoc weapon, as 
opposed to a knife or sword, might be taken to indicate the emotional spontaneity of 
killing in self-defence.29 
 Particularly significant are procedures de odio et atia, ‘concerning hatred and 
spite’, aimed at preventing malicious accusation.30 Procedure on this matter could 
take two forms.31 First there is the writ de odio et atia, which the thirteenth-century 
law-book known as Bracton states was intended to stop the iniquity of long 
imprisonment of the innocent accused of homicide, as they awaited the arrival of the 
eyre, the king’s itinerant justices, who would try their case.32 The accusation could 
have been by appeal (i.e. by an individual) or by indictment (i.e. by a local jury).33 
The writ ordered the sheriff to gather a jury to decide whether the person had been 
accused ‘by hatred and spite or because he is guilty, and if by hatred and spite by 
what hatred and spite’.34 If the accusation had been brought through hatred and spite, 
it did not necessarily indicate that the accused was innocent; instead, he was to be 
released on bail until the arrival of the eyre. The jury were therefore delving into the                                                         
28 Note also ibid., 71, on the canonist Raymond of Peñafort stating that killing in self-
defence had to be immediate if it was not to be reprehensible; delay rendered it 
vengeance. Pohl-Zucker, Making Manslaughter, has a very valuable analysis of pre-
meditation and other relevant issues. The relationship of emotion and pre-meditation, 
and its treatment in law, is of course complex; see e.g. Dan M. Kahan and Martha C. 
Nussbaum, ‘Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law’, 96 Columbia Law 
Review (1996), 269–374. 
29 See e.g. Hurnard, Pardon, 74–75, 93. 
30 See ibid., 339–374; Susanne Jenks, ‘The Writ and Exception de odio et atia’, 23 
Journal of Legal History (2002), 1–22; Hyams, Rancor, 175–183.  
31 The distinction is emphasized by Jenks, ‘Writ and Exception’. 
32 ‘Henry de Bracton’, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Anglie, ed. George E. 
Woodbine, rev. and trans. Samuel E. Thorne, 4 vols, Cambridge MA, 1968-77, vol.2, 
346. 
33 Jenks, ‘Writ and Exception’, 2. 
34 See Bracton, ed. Thorne, vol.2, 346–347; Early Registers of Writs, ed. and trans. 
Elsa de Haas and G. Derek G. Hall, 87 Selden Society (1970), CC. 109, and note also 
CC. 110. The writ does not appear in the earlier Registers in the volume.  
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field of emotions, or of inter-personal relations formulated in terms of emotion.35 
They had to examine not just whether the man was guilty or not, but whether a 
malicious accusation had been brought purely out of hatred and spite – many a 
truthful accusation may have had at least an element of hatred to it – and then further 
into aspects of that hatred and spite.  
 The second form of procedure was the exception de odio et atia.36 This was 
only used with respect to appeals, not presentments, but could be used regarding other 
felony accusations as well as those of homicide. The appellor brought his accusation; 
the defendant responded that the accusation was brought ‘out of hatred and spite’. 
This issue was then put to a jury; interestingly, even though felony cases brought by 
appeal should in the end be decided by trial by battle, people did not simply rely on 
God’s omniscience to produce the correct judgment. In cases at a central court, there 
would be need of a specially set up enquiry.37 If the case was being held at the eyre, 
the presentment jury might act, although, as we shall see shortly, a special enquiry 
might be obtained from the king by payment. The jurors were asked whether it was a 
‘true appeal’ – i.e. one brought in good faith – or was brought through hatred and 
spite. If the former, the case proceeded to the normal proof. If the latter, the appeal 
was reported either in terms of ‘hatred and spite’ or in terms of injustice without 
mentioning hatred and spite. Such amounted to a ‘not guilty’ verdict, an acquittal, and 
on some occasions the accused was specifically said to be ‘quit’. As with the writ, 
then, the jury was not being asked about the emotions involved in a proper appeal, but 
was identifying purely malicious appeals using the terminology of emotions.  
 Case records show how such accusations and exceptions could be tied up with 
underlying disputes: 
                                                        
35 Note e.g. the works of Bartlett and Smail cited in fnn. 000, 000. The publishers’ 
copyeditor may insist on short titles here, but we’ll wait and see. 
36  An ‘exception’ was a plea by the defendant that his opponent’s accusation, 
complaint, or claim was inapplicable to the case, for reasons of fact or law; the 
defendant should not, therefore, be required to make a formal defence to the 
accusation, complaint, or claim. 
37 See e.g. Pleas before the King or his Justices, 1198-1212, ed. and trans. Doris M. 
Stenton, 4 vols, 67, 68, 83, 84 Selden Society (1952-67), vol.4, no.4200. 
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John son of Thorold of Edlington appeals Andrew of Edlington that he came 
to the house of his father, with his force of men, and ejected those who were 
of his father’s party and his father, and treated him in such a way that 
thereafter he was as a result continuously ill to the day he died; and [Andrew] 
there took in robbery four swords and four hatchets and two bows and fifteen 
arrows and two sheets and five ells of linen cloth, and his father’s charters 
concerning his inheritance. This happened in such a way that the knights of 
the neighbourhood came there and found Andrew with his force of men in that 
house. 
 Andrew came and denied robbery and felony and besieging of the 
house and ejection of the father and his men, but acknowledged that Thorold 
was his uncle, the son of a priest, in such a way that the land concerned should 
descend to him after Thorold’s death, and that when he was approaching 
death, Andrew kept himself in that house without any force, as in the house 
that ought to descend to him from his uncle, and he kept himself in that house.   
[Postscript] Andrew gives ten marks to the lord king to have his 
judgment swiftly and to have an enquiry whether this appeal was made 
through just cause or through hate and spite, and to have licence to make 
agreement concerning another appeal, that is with Hugh his brother. Both 
place themselves in mercy for licence [to settle].38 
 
The exception de odio et atia was used quite frequently; the plea rolls of the central 
courts from the Michaelmas term 1203 to the Michaelmas term 1204 contain more                                                         
38 The Earliest Lincolnshire Assize Rolls, A.D. 1202-1209, ed. Doris M. Stenton, 22 
Lincolnshire Record Society (1926), no.594. Andrew’s underlying claim presumably 
was that John was illegitimate because his father was a priest; therefore Andrew was 
Thorold’s closest heir. In relation to the other appeal, against Hugh, note no.593. See 
also e.g. Curia Regis Rolls, vol.6, 152–153. Note also e.g. ibid., vol.1, 230–231, 
where the exception persuades the appellors to withdraw; vol.1, 469–470; vol.2, 50, 
which is tied up with a land case, and again the exception persuades the appellor to 
withdraw; vol.2, 180; Earliest Lincolnshire Assize Rolls, no. 607, no.841 (where the 
jurors say that ‘per attiam facit hoc appellum et non iusta de causa’); Pleas before the 
King or his Justices, vol.3, no.740, vol.4, no.3428, no.3458. 
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than half a dozen entries mentioning the issue of spite being raised.39 Does this mean 
that it was being instrumentalized, as a means of getting trial by jury instead of trial 
by battle, the normal form of proof arising from accusation by appeal?40 Certainly 
matters with an emotional element could become routinized, leaving a trace, for 
example, through use of emotion vocabulary.41 In this instance, however, it seems 
that the procedure retained its original purpose, at least in the period covered by this 
paper. It could be quite costly, as in the ten marks that Andrew of Edlington had to 
pay the king (a mark was two-thirds of a pound). And it was used not just against 
male but also against female appellors, whose appeals did not result in trial by battle. 
The exception, therefore, had not been transformed simply into a method of escaping 
a duel, but rather retained its purpose of countering appeals brought maliciously out 
of ‘hatred and spite’. 
 
IV. OFFICIAL RECORDS FROM ROYAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS 
 
It is notable that even in accounts of proceedings de odio et atia the plea rolls of the 
king’s courts actually mention little about emotions displayed in the courtroom or 
more generally once a case had been brought; rather they describe the events behind 
the appeal. In practice, those making the enquiries must have looked into matters of 
emotion, and made decisions arising therefrom. Yet the plea rolls are characterized in 
these matters as elsewhere by a significant degree of impersonality. 42  Only very 
occasionally do mentions, for example, of long-standing enmities appear. 43  This                                                         
39 Curia Regis Rolls, vol.3, 14, 37, 63, 94 110, 163, 202. It is not always clear in these 
cases exactly how or at what point the issue of spite was raised. 
40  Roger D. Groot, ‘The Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions before 1215’, 27 
American Journal of Legal History (1983), 113–141 at 113. 
41 See below, 000-000. 
42 A similar point is made by Hyams, Rancor, e.g. 162, 173, 190–191, 242–244. Note 
also e.g. Smail, Consumption, 92. 
43 Note Hyams, Rancor, 193–194; on plea roll entries occasionally ranging more 
broadly, see more generally Cyril T. Flower, Introduction to the Curia Regis Rolls, 62 
Selden Society (1944), 2–5. For reference to an offence being linked to ‘longstanding 
hatred [antiquam odium]’ underlying a crime, see Rotuli Curiæ Regis, vol.2, 278; the 
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characteristic exists from the earliest surviving plea rolls in the mid-1190s. It is easy 
simply to assume that plea rolls must have taken the form, included the type of matter 
included, that they do. Yet at some point or points decisions must have been taken as 
to form and content, and as to what to exclude. Could the impersonality have, for 
example, a link to development from records that initially were primarily financial?44 
Such would be a worthy subject for a separate study, albeit a necessarily speculative 
one. 
 Instead, here let us look at two cases, one criminal, the other concerning land, 
for which accounts survive both inside and outside plea rolls. Our first case is that of 
Thomas of Elderfield, which Paul Hyams has made well known.45 We have both a 
monastic narrative account, from a Worcester collection of the miracles of St 
Wulfstan, and an official legal record, from the rolls of the itinerant justices visiting 
Gloucestershire in 1221. 46  The miracle is the restoration of the convicted man’s 
testicles and eyes, which he had lost in the punishment of mutilation; not surprisingly, 
the account of the man after his punishment and of the miraculous restoration is 
infused with emotion, but this takes us away from the field of law. The miracle story 
also provides an extensive account of events that led to litigation, a tale filled with 
love and hate. Thomas had risen in the world, and had an affair with his lord’s wife 
who ‘kept him for about two years netted in the snares of Venus’. 47  Thomas 
eventually repented, and the spurned woman, now widowed, eventually married a                                                                                                                                                               
accused claimed that the appeal was brought ‘through spite’. For a 1262 plea roll 
entry mentioning the sighs and tears of a litigant, see Paul A. Brand, ‘The Origins of 
the English Legal Profession’, in his The Making of the Common Law, London, 1992, 
1–20 at 9. 
44 Note Paul Brand, ‘“Multis Vigiliis Excogitatam et Inventam”: Henry II and the 
Creation of the English Common Law’, in his Making of the Common Law, 77–102 at 
95. 
45 Paul R. Hyams, ‘The Strange Case of Thomas of Elderfield’, 36 History Today 
(1986), 9–15. 
46 Pleas of the Crown for the County of Gloucester, ed. Frederic William Maitland, 
London, 1884, no.87; The Vita Wulfstani of William of Malmesbury, ed. Reginald R. 
Darlington, New Series 40 Camden Society (1928), 168–175. 
47 Ibid., 169. 
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man named George. When George found that his wife had had an affair with Thomas 
during her first marriage, ‘he was tortured by suspicion and, fired by marital zeal, 
pursued the said Thomas with inexorable hatred’.48 After a drinking session the two 
came to blows, and Thomas, in self-defence according to the story, raised his axe to 
strike George. Accidentally he scratched George’s arm with the point at the back of 
the axe, just enough to draw blood. The account then shows George taking the correct 
legal steps. He complained to all whom he met that his blood had been drawn, and 
named who had done it. He said – untruthfully according to the account – that he had 
been wounded when innocent, and that Thomas was a violator of the king’s peace. He 
returned home, and then raised the hue and cry with a horn blast, claiming that 
Thomas had violently invaded his house without respect for the king’s peace, and 
wickedly [nequiter] carried off his goods like a robber [predonem], whilst George had 
received a mortal wound in defending his house. Those roused by the horn blast 
included Thomas’s father, who was arrested, taken to the sheriff, and imprisoned, but 
then released when bailed. Thomas too was arrested and released on several 
occasions, presumably on bail. These events apparently took place under King John, 
who died in 1216. It was only under John’s son Henry III that George proceeded with 
his appeal of wounding, and the case came before the itinerant justices in 1221. 
George was confident, Thomas put his trust in Christ, the Virgin Mary, and St 
Wulfstan, whilst weeping ‘copious tears [lacrimasque … copiosius infundens]’. 49 
George triumphed in the trial by battle. Although by the custom of the realm Thomas 
deserved hanging, the miracle account tells us that the justices mixed mercy in their 
judgment, and sentenced him only to castration and blinding, to be carried out by 
George’s neighbours and relatives. They duly did so, with relish, leaving Thomas in 
need of his miraculous restoration.  
 Here, then, we have a story full of emotions, but also one that is legally 
informed, notably about the content of George’s initial accusations and the way in 
which he established his case. The plea roll gives nothing of the background, be it the 
tale of adultery or the initial legal steps of establishing accusation and raising hue and 
cry.50 Time is compressed, with no indication that at least five years passed between                                                         
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 170. 
50 Note also that the place of Thomas’s father is rather different in the plea roll entry. 
 18 
offence and trial. It is entirely concerned with the steps in litigation before the king’s 
justices. In particular it concentrates on procedural matters. Who is the primary 
defendant? Is the appellor a maimed man, or should he undertake proof by battle? Has 
the accusation been properly made? It then reports the form of proof, the outcome, 
and the punishment. The extra-legal material is therefore excluded. Now it could be 
that the back story, even if not in the form told by miracle account, did have 
influence, but this was not recorded in the plea roll. The report tells us that the jurors, 
(that is those reporting offences to the eyre, not jurors deciding the case, which went 
to trial by battle) ‘well understand that that Thomas is guilty [culpabilis] of the wound 
and they know that the suit [i.e. preliminary accusation] was made as the coroners 
witness’. Yet this may be a purely factual assessment, rather than one taking into 
account the emotions involved.  
Our second case concerns inheritance; again it is well known and is often 
called the Cockfield dispute.51 It is recorded in the Bury St Edmunds chronicle of 
Jocelin of Brakelond, in other Bury documents, in a final concord (that is a document 
recording a settlement in the king’s court), and in a plea roll. It involves, on one side, 
the abbot and abbey of Bury and on the other the Cockfield family and others with 
connected interests. Relations between family and abbey do not seem to have been 
ones of long-standing conflict, although disputes over land at Cockfield had occurred 
as early as the Anglo-Saxon period.52 
Let us start with Jocelin’s account.53 Following the death of his father Robert, 
Adam of Cockfield came to the abbot and sought as his inheritance various lands and 
                                                        
51 For earlier discussions, note Sir James Holt, Colonial England 1066-1215, London, 
1997, 197–202; Hudson, Oxford History, 627–630; Joseph Biancalana. ‘The 
Administrative Image of English Society and the Origins of the Common Law’, 
(Unpublished paper, North American Conference on British Studies, Midwest 
Conference on British Studies, 27-28 October 1989), which also considers wider 
issues relevant to this article. Note how the bond of family to long-held land, a bond 
in part emotional, encouraged heritability. 
52  Holt, Colonial England, 200–201. For dispute in the Anglo-Saxon period, see 
Hudson, Oxford History, 133. 
53 Jocelin of Brakelond, Chronicle, ed. and trans. H. E. Butler, London, 1949, 58–59.  
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the half-hundred of Cosford. 54  He was accompanied by powerful supporters, 
including Earl Roger Bigod, presumably intended to instil fear if needed. The abbot 
made a gesture, a physical indication of his emotional commitment, to reinforce his 
response: he ‘put two of his fingers against his two eyes and said “May I lose these 
eyes on that day and in that hour when I grant to anyone a hundred to be held by 
hereditary right, unless the king, who can take away my abbey and my life, should 
force me to do so”’. The situation was a request being made to the abbot, perhaps in 
his court, rather than formal litigation; the dramatic gesture may have been intended 
to counter the powerful array of people whom Adam had brought with him. However, 
Jocelin then describes the abbot as shifting to a different kind of discourse, setting 
forth his ratio, his argument, in the form ‘if x, then y; if y, then z’:  
If any man should hold a hundred hereditarily, and should commit an offence 
against the king of such a kind that he ought to be disinherited, the sheriff of 
Suffolk and the king’s bailiffs would immediately seize the hundred and 
exercise their power within our bounds; and if they had custody of that 
hundred, the liberty of the eight and a half hundreds [the abbey’s specially 
privileged area] would be in peril. 
After the abbot had expanded on these legal arguments, a large amount of money was 
offered to him, but Jocelin says it left him unmoved, and describes the money as a 
‘bribe [precium]’. The offer is being firmly placed outside the realm of law, although 
Adam might have said that he was offering a relief, the payment legally required for 
inheritance. Eventually a settlement was reached, but one that made no mention of the 
Cockfield itself; silence may have been used as a way to remove emotion from the 
dispute, and thereby to encourage restoration of peaceful relations. 
 Jocelin returns to the matter of Cockfield later in his Chronicle, when Adam 
died, leaving a three-month-old daughter as heiress.55 The issue arose of who should 
have the custody of the young girl. Again this was a matter of negotiation, of gift-
giving, of influential friends. And again emotions heightened. The king, Richard I, 
grew angry with the abbot, and said ‘with great indignation that he would avenge 
himself [se uindicaret] on the proud abbot who contradicted him, save that he desisted                                                         
54 A half-hundred was an administrative unit, a division of the much more common 
hundred that was the administrative unit below the level of the county. 
55 Jocelin, Chronicle, 97–99. 
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out of reverence for St Edmund, whom he feared’. The abbot managed to assuage the 
anger and ‘the king wrote in friendly fashion [amicabiliter] to the abbot and 
demanded that he should give him some of his dogs’. The abbot complied, and also 
sent other gifts, whereupon in the presence of great men the king praised the abbot’s 
courage and loyalty ‘and as a token of his friendship and love [signum familiaritatis et 
amoris]’ gave him a valuable ring, once a gift to the king from the pope. 
 Finally Jocelin reaches litigation concerning the land. 56  The wardship of 
Adam’s daughter had been sold on to Thomas de Burgh, brother of the king’s 
chamberlain. The abbey sought to keep in its hands three manors, Cockfield, Semer, 
and Groton, or at least Semer and Groton, 
both because Robert of Cockfield on his deathbed had publicly said that he 
could claim nothing by hereditary right in those two manors, and because 
Adam his son had in full court reconsigned those two manors to us and made a 
charter concerning it, in which it was written that he held these two manors by 
grace of the convent for his lifetime only. 
Jocelin’s tone is precise and legal, and he goes on to display knowledge of legal 
terminology: Thomas sought ‘a writ of recognition [breue de recognicione]’, and 
made knights be summoned to Tewkesbury to swear before the king. However, his 
account of proceedings also reveals the influence of the extra-legal and emotional. At 
the hearing ‘our charter was read out in public’. The knights themselves had 
justifications for ignoring the abbey’s evidence, saying ‘that they knew nothing about 
our charters nor about private agreements’. The abbey or at least Jocelin had a 
different explanation, one framed in terms that can be related to the emotional bias of 
those deciding the case: the reading of the charter ‘had no impact, since the whole 
court was against us’.  
 Other relevant Bury documentation survives. As well as earlier charters, there 
are a list of certain lands that Adam of Cockfield held from the abbot, and a record by 
William of Diss concerning lands of Robert of Cockfield, including Robert’s 
acknowledgment that he was not entitled to have any hereditary right in Groton and 
                                                        
56 Ibid., 123–124. 
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Semer.57 Neither the list nor William’s record touches on matters of emotion. As for 
royal records, from 1191 we have a final concord; this reveals that Jocelin hid 
litigation concerning the half-hundred, which Adam of Cockfield brought against the 
abbot by a writ of mort d’ancestor, a royal order initiating an action concerning 
inheritance. 58  The text is unusually detailed in its record of rent payments, but 
contains nothing concerning emotions.59 Finally we have a plea roll entry regarding 
the litigation over Cockfield, Semer, and Groton in 1201.60 The opening of the entry 
mirrors the language of the writ of mort d’ancestor, indicating how the writ 
standardized the issues that might be raised in the action: whether Adam was seised in 
his demesne as of fee farm of the lands on the day he died, and if his daughter was his 
closest heir. Elements significant in Jocelin’s account are excluded. The case is 
presented as being between Adam’s daughter, ‘who is under age’, and the abbey, with 
no mention of Thomas de Burgh. And, unsurprisingly, there is no mention of the bias 
of the court. Only one unusual phrase hints at the tensions between abbey and jurors. 
Normally the record would just specify what the jurors ‘say’; here four extra Latin 
words have been inserted: ‘but they well know that [set bene sciunt quod] … the 
aforesaid Adam died seised thereof as of fee farm’.61                                                          
57 The Kalendar of Abbot Samson of Bury St. Edmunds and Related Documents, ed. 
Ralph H. C. Davis, 3rd Series 84 Camden Society (1954), 71–72; Jocelin, Chronicle, 
138–139.  
58 For a concise summary of mort d’ancestor, and the particular circumstances of its 
availability and use, see Hudson, Oxford History, 604–606. The lands concerned had 
to be heritable; in the Cockfield case this was phrased in terms of ‘fee farm’, i.e. lands 
held heritably for a fixed rent. 
59 Feet of Fines in the Public Record Office of the Reign of Henry II. and of the First 
Seven Years of the Reign of Richard I., 17 Pipe Roll Society (1894), no.11. 
60 Curia Regis Rolls, vol.1, 430. 
61 An alternative reading is that the extra words indicate that the justices had to 
persuade the jurors to be less cautious; if so, the jurors seem to have been less hostile 
to the abbot than Jocelin suggests. The issue of jurors’ emotions affecting them is 
clear from Bracton’s discussion (ed. Thorne, vol.2, 71) of exceptions to jurors, i.e. the 
raising of issues that would lead to their exclusion; grounds included ‘enmity, great 
not light, and present, not that which once existed but no longer exists at the time the 
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 The preceding analysis reveals the differences between reports of cases in 
various types of source. The differences are partly a matter of genre, and of 
assessment of what is significant. But there is a further factor, the portion of the 
dispute which the text is describing. Thus the plea roll is focused on formal litigation 
in court; it is noteworthy that in Jocelin too and even in the Worcester miracle story, 
the degree to which the emotions of participants forms part of the account of the 
formal litigation is limited. Emotion is more prominent on other occasions when legal 
matters were raised, for example the initial request for the inheritance in the Cockfield 
case. The analysis therefore not only suggests that legal sources may deliberately have 
excluded matters of emotion, but also again indicates that when assessing the 
relationship between law and emotion, one must distinguish different fields: thinking 
about law in general; legal matters outside court; law in court, i.e. litigation, and 
within that field, law in court as it was supposed to be and law in court as it might be 
in practice. 
Examination of the plea rolls therefore confirms the impression gained from 
Glanvill that legal sources largely attempted to exclude matters of emotion. Such 
exclusion was not completely new with the development of the common law in the 
later twelfth century. For example, twelfth-century English charters tend to the 
concise and formulaic, excluding the type of narrative material sometimes 
[sometimes?] present in land conveyances in other places or periods; there is a sense 
of an appropriate legal register of language.62 Or take final concords, the records of 
agreed settlements. These might easily have routinely included at least the language 
of emotion. Glanvill’s discussion of concords made in the king’s court starts: ‘it often 
happens that pleas begun in the lord king’s court are ended by amicable composition 
and final concord’.63 Of course ‘amicable’ need not indicate real emotion, but the use                                                                                                                                                               
juror is produced. Also because of present friendship, just as because of hatred’. Note 
Rotuli Curiæ Regis, vol.1, 321 for a party stating that not all those who viewed 
whether he really was ill were knights and that all were his mortal enemies. Cf. Smail, 
Consumption, 95–117, on exceptions to witnesses in Marseille.  
62 See in general Hudson, Land, Law, and Lordship. 
63 Glanvill, Bk viii ch. 1, ed. Hall, 94. See more broadly on love and settlements, e.g. 
Michael T. Clanchy, ‘Law and Love in the Middle Ages’, in J. Bossy, ed., Disputes 
and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in the West, Cambridge, 1983, 47–67. 
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of the term remains noteworthy, in contrast to the general absence of emotion words 
from final concords themselves. 64  This is true too of final concords even before 
copies were routinely kept by the royal government from 1195 onwards.65 Yet the 
exclusion of matters and language of emotion in the records of litigation from the 
early common law period remains significant, and as I have suggested indicates 
deliberate decisions as to what is required in a legal record and, less directly, what is 
important in litigation and law more widely. 
 Was the same true of the earliest surviving official records from ecclesiastical 
courts in England? Given the interest of ecclesiastical writers such as Thomas of 
Chobham in issues of motivation and emotion, one might have expected the 
ecclesiastical court records to be different in content and perhaps tone from the royal 
ones.66 The records survive from much the same time as the earliest plea rolls, and are 
associated with a figure who may have had a very significant influence on royal 
record-keeping, Hubert Walter, leading royal official and archbishop of Canterbury.67 
Because they relate to trials held according to canonical procedure, these records are 
of a very different nature from the royal plea rolls. In particular they include 
depositions of witness statements. These perhaps might be expected to be more 
concerned with matters of emotion, but in fact the depositions give little space to such 
matters, presumably reflecting what the ecclesiastical judges or their officials 
considered important. If emotions are mentioned, or emotion words are used,                                                         64 Cf. Curia Regis Rolls, vol.1, 425, for a party mentioning an agreement by royal 
licence which involved not just a quitclaim and homage but also a kiss of peace and 
the pardoning of all ill-will. 
65 For use of emotion vocabulary, note the mention of ‘love of God’ being part of the 
inspiration for settlement in English Lawsuits from William I to Richard I, ed. and 
trans. R. C. van Caenegem, 106, 107 Selden Society (1990, 1991), no.572. 
66 Note the very interesting discussion of Thomas’s writings in Hyams, Rancor, 48–
58. For Thomas, see <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5007> accessed 1 Feb. 
2017.  
67 Select Cases from the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Province of Canterbury, c. 1200-
1301, ed. and trans. Norma Adams and Charles Donahue, 95 Selden Society (1981). 
For Hubert, see <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28633> accessed 1 Feb. 
2017. 
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occurrences tend to be in information regarding the background to the court case 
rather than points of particular legal consequence. A certain William de Plaiz ‘came 
to the bishop [of Bath] weeping [flens] and saying “My lord R., I shall not be a canon 
of Wells any more, and I will be degraded henceforth among my fellows”, and the 
bishop, moved by his tears [motus ad lacrimas eius]…, conceded to him that he 
would be a canon’.68 Fear might be mentioned, but with no great emotional content, 
and not necessarily as a legal justification for an action. Thus a party in a dispute 
explains that a clerk was staying in a church to guard it ‘because they feared 
[timebant] that a certain knight who claimed for himself the right of patronage in it 
might enter into it’. 69  There are some issues where emotion language within 
testimony could have legal import, for example as to whether a couple were married: 
it might be stated that the man ‘honoured’ the woman ‘and held her dear [caram] as 
[tanquam] his wife’.70 There are also comments on how witnesses gave testimony, 
comments that may suggest an effect on the weight that would be given to their 
words: one ‘seemed … to speak lukewarmly, and not constantly, and to offer a 
premeditated speech’, another – whose testimony varied – spoke ‘timidly and with 
trepidation’. Here an assessment of the emotional state of the witness, based on 
somatic as well as verbal signs, could have some legal consequence.71  
Besides depositions we have also a notification of complaints of the prior and 
convent of Rochester against their bishop. Here emotion language is used to give 
force to the complaints: 
Sighing from the lake of miseries and oppressions, looking to the equity of 
your pondering, in the bowels of mercy of our God we ask relief from this 
grave yoke, that having the fear of God here before your eyes, here the rights 
                                                        
68 Select Cases, A.4 (at 14). Note also e.g. hatred mentioned in A.6 (at 19) as part of 
the explanation as to why a man did not want his kinsfolk at his side at his espousal.   
69 Ibid., A.4 (at 12; see also 13). 
70 Ibid., A.6 (at 22).  
71 Ibid., A.6 (at 21, 22). A further deposition mentions the terrorising of witnesses, a 
legal issue in itself; ibid., A.12 (at 37). On matters affecting witnesses and jurors in 
secular law, note Hyams, Rancor, 40–43. 
 25 
of our liberties carefully exploring, you may please the right Judge whose eyes 
see all rights by judging the right of every right.72 
In addition, fear again becomes a legal issue, fear which also perhaps has a greater 
emotional content than in some other instances. The prior and convent mention that 
‘out of fear … of his [i.e. the bishop’s] power, since we could not prevent and feared 
greater, we suspended prosecution of our appeals’. And they specify that ‘in all of 
these matters we can prove probable fear which can fall on a most constant man’. 
This alludes to the ‘constant man’ test for invalidating a legal act on grounds of fear, a 
test that appears in canon law.73 
 So, as in the common law records, we find in the ecclesiastical court records 
that mentions of emotion and use of an emotional vocabulary depended on situation. 
They are more present, as one would expect, in petitioning, and similarly appear in 
requests, petitions, and complaints to the king. 74  In witness depositions to 
ecclesiastical courts appear the type of back-story largely absent from common law 
records, and these sometimes include descriptions of emotion or emotion language, 
with the narrative being constructed in a way that may have been intended to affect 
the emotions of those hearing the case.75 Emotions are largely absent from issues of 
litigation. As we have also seen in examining the Thomas of Elderfield and Cockfield 
cases, the limits of mention of emotion in courtroom litigation need not just be a                                                         
72 Select Cases, A.15 (at 41); note also the whipping up of emotional effect at 45–46 
(‘bestowal on gluttons’ and so on), and at 46 (suffering with bitterness of spirit, as 
well as a further reference to fear). Note further the presentation (at 42) of a good 
bishop as one who treated the monks of his church with ‘paternal affection’ and 
nourished them ‘with a maternal breast’. Some such lengthy complaints may reflect 
rhetorical training and rhetorical learning on emotions; see e.g. Copeland, ‘Affectio’, 
esp. 11–20. 
73 Select Cases, A.15 (at 45). For the canonical reference, see the Liber Extra, X. 
4.1.16). 
74 Note e.g. English Lawsuits, no.351; also e.g. Curia Regis Rolls, vol.3, 14, to the 
king’s justices.  
75 See below, 000, on the possibility that pleaders might have sought to introduce such 
material into common law courts, but without this featuring in the records. Note also 
Kamali, ‘The Devil’s Daughter’. 
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product of the legal record, of its genre and purpose; it could reflect what was 
considered proper to legal process at a particular stage. 
 The unemotional tone of the records of litigation in the king’s court, therefore, 
is partly a matter of the nature of the record, but also reflects other factors, including 
the fact that a great mass of court business was routine. Amidst the few dramatic 
cases were a plethora of excuses for non-attendance, appointments of attorneys, and 
so on. The increasing presence of attorneys rather than the litigants themselves may 
on occasion have changed or reduced the emotions of the courtroom, especially if the 
attorneys were not closely related to those whom they were representing.76 Indeed, 
the atmosphere of royal courts for much of their extended terms may have been very 
different from the single day and periodic sittings of, say, county courts, with their 
very diverse business. Scribal injections of humour into the plea rolls suggest that 
even the clerks of the courts found the experience dull.77 And the image of legal 
proceedings emerging from records, with its strongly administrative tone, could 
become self-reinforcing. Justices’ clerks might become justices, justices controlled 
proceedings of the courts, and litigants would learn what was effective in winning 
their cases. Litigation in court thus became more distanced from other aspects of life. 
 
V. FURTHER POSSIBILTIES 
 
Many further aspects of the relationship between law and emotions could be 
examined. Some of these already have been examined by others with conscious 
reference to the history of emotions, for example Paul Hyams’ exploration of possible 
theological reasons for ecclesiastical courts not having adversarial process.78 Other 
existing studies, for example of juries modifying outcomes of accusations, can be 
taken further when informed by specific examination of emotions.79 One might also 
look at how common emotional assumptions affected procedure, even though the                                                         
76 Paul A. Brand, The Origins of the English Legal Profession, Oxford, 1992. 
77 Flower, Introduction to the Curia Regis Rolls, 7–8. 
78 Hyams, Rancor, 55.  
79 Green, Verdict According to Conscience; Kamali, ‘The Devil’s Daughter’, and also 
Elizabeth Papp Kamali, A Felonious State of Mind: Mens Rea in Thirteenth- and 
Fourteenth-Century England (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 2015). 
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emotions might be left implicit. The attachment of son to father allowed him to act as 
witness and participant in trial by battle in a land case when his father died; Glanvill 
phrases this in terms of ‘the faith by which son is bound to father’.80 The greatest 
contrast would be with the professional champion, who was clearly strongly disliked, 
Thomas of Chobham writing of such men’s ‘fraternal hatred’.81  
 Another potentially fruitful area of study is the routinized use of emotion-
related words in law. For example, there is the notion of contempt, be it of an order or 
of a court.82 Glanvill frequently mentions contempt of court, leading to the offender 
being punished or at least being in the king’s mercy, that is owing a monetary 
penalty.83 In particular one might examine the wording of the new, routine writs that 
were at the centre of the actions of the early common law, writs such as that of mort 
d’ancestor which we encountered in the Cockfield case. Their tone is very different 
from the apparently unroutinized earlier statements of emotion, as in a writ of Henry 
II, possibly from 1155: 
I am astonished and greatly displeased that you have not done what I ordered 
you in my other writs concerning the manor of Heatherslaw, which the monks 
of Durham claim. Now, moreover, I firmly order you on my forfeiture to 
execute my order without delay so that I hear no further complaint [clamorem] 
on this matter for want of full justice.84 
It is of course dangerous simply to read such statements as unmediated descriptions of 
the king’s emotions. Royal fury could, to varying extents, be formalized, as Jolliffe 
                                                        
80 Glanvill, Bk ii ch. 3, ed. Hall, 23. Note the mentions of shame in Glanvill: see esp. 
Bk ii ch. 7, ed. Hall, 28, with reference to ‘the reproach of the perpetual disgrace 
which follows that distressed and shameful word which sounds so dishonourably from 
the mouth of the vanquished’ in trial by battle; Bk xiv ch. 6, ed. Hall, 176, concerning 
marriage after rape. 
81  Hyams, Rancor, 53; Thomas de Chobham, Summa Confessorum, ed. F. 
Broomfield, Louvain, 1968, 293.  
82 For contempt of a royal order, see e.g. English Lawsuits, no.446. 
83 See Glanvill, Bk i chs. 31, 32, 33, iii ch. 6, xiii ch. 10, ed. Hall, 20–21, 42, 153.  
84 English Lawsuits, no.361C.  
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showed in his study of Angevin ‘anger and ill-will [ira et malevolentia]’.85 Nor do 
expressions of particular royal anger disappear when the routine common law writs 
emerge. However, the exceptional statements of anger can be contrasted with the 
standardized ending of certain routine common law writs, in which any emotional 
element of the threat has become veiled: for example, ‘and if you do not do it, the 
sheriff will, that s/he need not complain further on this matter for default of right’.86  
 Moreover, in the routine writs of the common law, some state that the person 
bringing the case was ‘complaining [queri or conqueri]’, as opposed, for example to 
‘seeking’ or ‘claiming’.87 It may be that the word ‘complain’ retained traces of its 
emotional charge, at least in comparison with other words such as ‘to seek’: these 
were cases where the litigant was saying that the opponent had done something to 
them, rather than just being in possession of something that was theirs. Some writs 
open with the phrase ‘It has been complained to me’: when the litigant complained 
that his opponent was seeking to reduce him to villeinage;88 or that his mother had 
more of his inheritance as dower than she should;89 or that someone had unjustly and                                                         
85 J. E. A. Jolliffe, Angevin Kingship, London, 1955. Formalization of course need not 
have made royal anger any less frightening for its victims. For a broader European 
context, see e.g. Gerd Althoff, ‘Ira Regis: Prologomena to a History of Royal Anger’, 
in Rosenwein, Anger’s Past, 59–74. Note also the discussions in White, ‘Feelings in 
the Feud’, and Daniel Lord Smail, ‘Hatred as a Social Institution in Late-Medieval 
Society’, 76 Speculum (2001), 90–126. 
86 Glanvill, Bk vi ch. 5, xii chs. 5, 10, ed. Hall, 61, 138, 141. Cf. Glanvill, Bk xii ch. 4, 
ed. Hall, 138, using the word ‘clamor’. 
87 I have found no clear distinction of meaning between ‘queri’ and ‘conqueri’. For 
‘petere’, ‘to claim’ or ‘to seek’, see e.g. Glanvill, Bk xiii chs. 2-3, ed. Hall, 149–150, 
on mort d’ancestor. Note that the distinction is not so clearly maintained in the plea 
rolls, particularly the earliest ones; see e.g. Rotuli Curiæ Regis, vol.1, 64, 315, 369, 
vol.2, 66, 117, 213, Curia Regis Rolls, vol.1, 185, vol.3, 134, 135, for parties bringing 
novel disseisin being referred to as petentes; ibid., vol.2, 121, for parties bringing 
mort d’ancestor being referred to as querentes. 
88 Glanvill, Bk v ch. 2, ed. Hall, 54. 
89 Glanvill, Bk vi ch. 18, ed. Hall, 68–69. This instance may seem rather different to 
the others, more like the claim of unjustified possession rather than the doing of a 
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without judgment disseised him of his free tenement. 90 The first writ in Glanvill, 
sometimes referred to as Precipe quod reddat, speaks in terms not of a claim to right 
to land, but of a complaint that another is ‘withholding’ land from the person bringing 
the writ; again, the focus is on the wrong done to the litigant. 91  The verb ‘to 
complain’ is also used, for example, with reference to impleading concerning the 
advowson of a church in an ecclesiastical court, when it should happen in the king’s 
court;92 or to an opponent detaining a debt,93 or detaining distrained moveables;94 or 
to the denial of justice. 95  Glanvill himself uses the participle ‘conquerens’, i.e. 
‘complaining’, with reference to a woman who is complaining that her proper dower 
is being withheld;96 a party complaining that a final concord has not been kept;97 and 
a debtor complaining that his creditor is still maliciously retaining a gage despite the 
debt having been paid.98  
 Use of the word ‘complain’ therefore characterizes pleas where the party is 
focusing on a wrong done by the opponent. Such may be seen as forming one 
fundamental category of pleas. The other fundamental category is where the party 
seeks something that is in the opponent’s possession, claiming that it belongs to him                                                                                                                                                               
wrong; however, the choice of the word ‘complain’ in the writ suggests contemporary 
perceptions of the form of wrong.  
90 Glanvill, Bk xiii chs. 33–37, ed. Hall, 167–168. 
91 Glanvill, Bk i chs. 5–6, ed. Hall, 5. 
92 Glanvill, Bk iv ch. 14, xii chs. 21, 22, ed. Hall, 53, 146. 
93 Glanvill, Bk x chs. 1–2, ed. Hall, 116; see also Bk x chs. 4, 6, 7, ed. Hall, 118, 121–
122. 
94 Glanvill, Bk xii chs. 12, 18, ed. Hall, 142, 144; see also Bk xii ch. 13, xiii ch. 38, 
ed. Hall, 142, 170. Note also Bk ix ch. 4, ed. Hall, 109, on the persistent refusal by a 
lord to accept homage and relief; Bk xii ch. 9, ed. Hall, 141, on unjust demands for 
customs and services. 
95 Glanvill, Bk xii ch. 7, ed. Hall, 139; and routinely in the phrase ‘that s/he need not 
complain further on this matter for default of right’, above, 000. 
96 Glanvill, Bk vi ch. 11, ed. Hall, 64.  
97 Glanvill, Bk viii ch. 3, ed. Hall, 96–97. 
98 Glanvill, Bk x ch. 8, ed. Hall, 124. Note also e.g. Glanvill, Bk ix ch. 13, ed. Hall, 
115. 
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or her.99 Such a claim may then be supplemented by complaint of witholding, and 
some writs combine the two elements: ‘Command N. that justly and without delay he 
release the advowson of the church … to R., who claims that it belongs to him and 
complains that N. unjustly withholds it from him’.100 Claim and complaint are thus 
distinguished clearly. In such ways, considering the routinized use of once 
emotionally-charged words can have obvious significance for the historian of law; 
less directly, it should also be of major interest the historian of emotions. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has been concerned with the relationship of emotions and law in the 
Angevin period. It began by suggesting that those interested in the relationship of 
emotions and law can profitably look at a multiplicity of functions of law and of 
situations in which law comes into play. Next, in considering the alienability of land, 
we saw how law could be used to further people’s emotion-inspired aims, through the 
legal securing of grants. Yet legal developments during the period also encouraged in 
various ways some aspects of law to become more discrete from emotions, at least in 
certain circumstances. Such a distancing may in part have been an unplanned 
extension of the use of law to counter the effects of what were seen as excessive or 
improper or transient emotions. The notion that law could have this purpose may then 
have encouraged the view manifest in Glanvill that law was closely associated with 
reason, ratio, at least implicitly contrasted with emotion, in Latin sometimes affectio. 
Next the article argued that whilst new official records give a particular perspective 
on the inter-actions of law and emotion, this perspective not only can be clarified by                                                         
99 See Hudson, Oxford History, 70, for further elaboration of this argument. 
100 Glanvill, Bk iv ch. 2, ed. Hall, 45; the basic form of Precipe, cited above, 000, 
does not refer to a claim, just to the wrongful withholding. Note also the form of the 
writ of right in Glanvill, Bk xii ch. 5, ed. Hall, 138. Cf. Glanvill, Bk vi ch. 15, ed. 
Hall, 66, concerning dower. Note the deforciant clause in later writs of right, which 
are used in conjunction with reference to claims to hold land from the addressee. In 
the earliest Register the deforciant may but need not be the addressee, in subsequent 
Registers the deforciant appears distinct from the addressee; Early Registers, Hib. 1; 
cf. CA. 1, CC. 1, R. 1. 
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examining other types of source but may also have reflected and reinforced attitudes 
with important effects on legal development. It ended by exploring how the imprint 
on legal discourse of routinized, but possibly once emotionally-charged, vocabulary 
can be revealing to legal historians. 
It is important not to exaggerate the degree of change, of distancing of law 
from emotion, in this period. Perception of the proper relationship of law and emotion 
might depend on the type of legal situation, for example petitioning as opposed to 
litigation, and also on the view-point of different parties. We have seen how emotions 
might affect legal matters outside court. We also hear, for example, of innocent 
parties fleeing through fear of accusation, their flight having legal consequences for 
themselves. 101  Emotions underlay disputes and might motivate the bringing of 
actions. And emotions could unjustly affect proceedings in court – at least in the eyes 
of the losing party. It may well be that as specialist attorneys appeared, one of their 
skills was in manipulation of emotion, one of the traditional skills of forensic 
rhetoricians; was such manipulation a talent of John Bucuinte, that is John ‘Oily 
mouth’? 102  As for judging, Glanvill emphasizes impartiality as a virtue, with 
impartiality arising from being guided by the laws of the realm and by customs which 
have their origins in reason.103 However, narrative depictions of Angevin kings acting 
as judges do not differ significantly from those of their predecessors. Favour and 
emotion may have entered particularly into the king’s judicial activities in relation to 
those who held their lands directly from him. Cases involving such ‘tenants-in-chief’ 
were not covered by routine procedures in the way that other tenants’ litigation had 
come to be, and their treatment might anyway be more politically charged.104 
 Yet the changes remain significant. Some of the process of distancing may 
have been intended, some an indirect result or by-product of other developments.105 It 
may be that the justices who heard pleas in place of the king often although not 
invariably encouraged routinization, removing emotional and other factors from court.                                                         
101 Hurnard, Pardon, 131. 
102 Hudson, Oxford History, 587–588.  
103 Glanvill, Prol, ed. Hall, 1–2. 
104 See esp. Sir James Holt, Magna Carta, 3rd edn, Cambridge, 2015, ch. 5.  
105 See e.g. above, 000, on control of excessive emotion, 000, on court business and 
record keeping; cf. above, 000-00, on writs and exceptions de odio et atia. 
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They were often outsiders, with little or no interest in the parties.106 Emotion might be 
the motive for bringing an action, but that action needed to be valid in legal terms, 
and when necessary emotion had to be set aside in its conduct.107 The lack of an 
earlier equivalent prevents comparison, but the generally emotionless, logical tone of 
Glanvill as a procedural manual does seem significant.108 Such a distancing of law 
from emotion fits with instances of distancing of secular law from social norms as 
well as from religion – a mortgage was, according to Glanvill, not simply ‘unjust and 
dishonourable’ but also a form of usury and by implication sinful, yet it was not 
forbidden by the king’s court.109 Law could, by its internal logic expressed in its own 
particular discourse, reach socially and emotionally unexpected conclusions. This is 
clearest in Glanvill but could also be manifest in litigation. Law’s tendency to fit a 
wide diversity of situations into a limited number of set forms became considerably 
stronger in the Angevin period. This process had the effect of excluding much from 
litigation, and treated other matters – including, as we have seen, some relating to 
emotions – in a particular, restricted and formalized way.  
The predominant view-point in the article has been that of royal justices; 
others must at times have thought not that emotions were wrongly intruding into 
matters of law but that law was wrongly constraining matters of emotion. 
Furthermore, if law was being further separated from emotion, the very distancing of 
law from social expectation inevitably produced emotional responses. In 1192 the 
monks of Bury complained to their abbot that they were not receiving additional 
revenue from the borough, despite its growing wealth.110 The burgesses’ resistance                                                         
106  Note also Jocelin, Chronicle, 34: having just mentioned Abbot Samson’s 
appointment as a royal itinerant justice, Jocelin states that ‘his men complained to him 
in the court of St Edmund, because he would not rush to judgment, nor “believe every 
spirit”, but proceeded in accordance with judicial process, knowing that the merits of 
cases are revealed by the statements of the parties’. 
107 See e.g. English Lawsuits, no.641. For a case brought out of malice by Ranulf de 
Glanville, see ibid., no.553. 
108 Hudson, ‘Leges to Glanvill’, provides arguments as to why the change should be 
seen as more than just the appearance of a new type of source. 
109 See Glanvill, Bk x ch. 8, ed. Hall, 124; Hudson, ‘Leges to Glanvill’.  
110 Jocelin, Chronicle, 78–79. 
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provoked annoyance, perhaps anger amongst the monks, who asked that the abbot 
disseise the burgesses of their holdings. The abbot expressed his sympathy, but said 
he had to proceed by judicial process and could not disseise free men of their lands 
without judgment of a court; otherwise he would fall into the king’s mercy by the 
assize of the realm. The monks decided they had to put up with the existing situation, 
but eventually the abbot agreed to confirm the town’s liberties. Again the monks had 
to accept this, but the matter was clearly one of some emotion and also of emotional 
calculation; the monks did not wish to provoke the abbot to anger, but still they 
murmured and grumbled. The pattern of interplay between law and emotion might 
have changed, but it had most certainly not disappeared. 
 
VII. CODA 
 
This paper has been concerned with the relationship of law and emotion, and of the 
history of law and the history of emotions. I have argued that one characteristic of the 
development of the early common law was that some aspects of law, of legal thought, 
legal process, legal record, grew more discrete from emotion. At the same time, the 
argument rests to an extent on a certain conception of what is law and of what is legal 
history. Such conceptions are of course contested, and the relationship between law 
and emotion, and between the history of law and the history of emotions, will be 
greatly affected by one’s conception of law and of legal history. A legal positivist will 
take a different view from a proponent of critical legal studies, a legal realist a 
different view from a proponent of law and economics.111 Historians interested in 
legislation and royal administration of justice will differ from those interested in 
processes of disputing, those interested in the social functioning of law and 
participants’ decision-making will differ from those interested in elementary legal                                                         
111 Likewise differences may exist within such broad jurisprudential fields; for one 
approach in which issues of emotions clearly are of importance, note e.g. Christine 
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics’, 50 Stanford Law Review (1998), 1471–1550. Of course thinking about 
emotions is diverse, just as is thinking about law, and has an effect on thinking about 
the relationship between the two; see e.g. Abrams and Keren, ‘Who’s Afraid of Law 
and the Emotions?’; Bandes, Passions, 11–12. 
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ideas and their development. Different conceptions of law and of legal history draw 
different boundaries between the legal and the extra-legal. These differing boundaries 
have considerable implications for the relationship between law and emotion. But 
these issues need not be seen as frustrating analysis of law and emotion; rather by 
posing questions, stimulating debate, they should encourage the fertile development 
of this important field. 
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